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ABSTRACT
While some of mental disorders due to emotional distress occur cross-culturally, others 
seem to be much more bound to particular cultures. In this paper, I propose that many of 
these “cultural syndromes” are culturally sanctioned responses to overwhelming negative 
emotions. I show how tools from cultural evolution theory can be employed for understand-
ing how the syndromes are relatively confined to and retained within particular cultures. 
Finally, I argue that such an account allows for some cultural syndromes to be or become 
mental disorders and also steers clear of some of the anti-realist trappings associated with 
a social constructivism of cultural syndromes.
Keywords: cultural syndromes, mental disorders, emotional distress, cultural evolution, so-
cial learning, social constructivism.
RESUMO
Enquanto alguns transtornos mentais devidos a problemas emocionais se manifestam atra-
vés de diferentes culturas, outros parecem ser muito mais circunscritos a culturas específi-
cas. Nesse artigo, proponho que muitas dessas “síndromes culturais” são respostas cultu-
ralmente sancionadas a emoções avassaladoramente negativas. Mostro como ferramentas 
da teoria da evolução cultural podem ser empregadas para compreendermos como certas 
síndromes podem ser relativamente confinadas a culturas específicas. Finalmente, argu-
mento que tal explicação também evita algumas das armadilhas antirrealistas associadas ao 
construtivismo social sobre síndromes culturais.
Palavras-chave: síndromes culturais, transtornos mentais, angústia emocional, evolução 
cultural, aprendizagem social, construtivismo social.
Introduction
There is by now considerable agreement that most emotions are adaptive or at least broad-
ly functional (Frank, 1993; Tooby and Cosmides, 1990; Linquist, 2007; De Block and Cuypers, 
2012). Still some emotions pose not only occasional but systematic challenges to our well-being: 
we are overcome by sadness, grief and loss; we become traumatized by fear and shock related to 
violence and war; and we develop mental disorders due to emotional suffering. While some of 
these mental disorders due to emotional distress occur cross-culturally, others seem to be much 
more bound to particular cultures. In this paper, I propose that many of these “cultural syn-
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dromes” (CS) should be understood as culturally sanctioned 
responses to overwhelming negative emotions. I propose that 
tools from cultural evolution theory can be employed as a 
framework for understanding how the syndromes are con-
fined to and retained within particular cultures, while also 
steering clear of some of the anti-realist trappings associated 
with a social constructivism of cultural syndromes. 
I proceed as follows: I begin by offering some examples 
of cultural syndromes (“Cultural syndromes”). In “Social 
learning of cultural syndromes”, I explore how cultural evo-
lution theory might account for the cultural retention and 
variability of such syndromes. I argue for the need to include 
motivational biases in addition to cognitive and environmen-
tal scaffolding in the account of social learning as a mecha-
nism for cultural retention and reproduction. Finally, in “Are 
cultural syndromes social constructions?”, I turn to the more 
philosophically oriented task of showing how a cultural evo-
lutionist need not be committed to a social constructivism of 
cultural syndromes and can allow for them to be or develop 
into mental disorders. 
Cultural syndromes
DSM-V defines cultural syndromes as, “clusters of symp-
toms and attributions that tend to co-occur among individ-
uals in specific cultural groups, communities, or contexts… 
that are recognized locally as coherent patterns of experience” 
(APA, 2013, p. 758). Although some examples of cultural 
syndromes are included in the DSM-V, there is considerable 
controversy about the nature and scope of such syndromes. 
For example, what the DSM-IV referred to as “culture-bound 
syndromes”, is with now replaced with “cultural syndromes” 
to reflect that some previously classified syndromes were not 
cultural bound per se, but instead syndromes which displayed 
cross-cultural variations in terms of different presentations in 
different cultures (APA, 2013; see also Lewis-Fernandez and 
Kleinman, 1995). While this move potentially has the effect 
of narrowing down the category, some have in contrast ar-
gued that the extension of cultural syndromes might be wider 
than how it is currently being employed by the DSM-V. For 
example, it has been argued that some predominantly west-
ern disorders, such as bulimia nervosa and anorexia could just 
as well be understood as a cultural syndrome even if DSM-V 
classifies it as an (cross-culturally occurring) eating disorder 
(Littlewood, 1996). Finally, it is worth emphasizing that cul-
tural syndromes might be no less serious or less requiring of 
professional assistance than other cross-cultural anxiety or dis-
tress disorders (Sumathipala et al., 2004). 
While it is important to keep such issues in mind and not 
make too much of either the “cultural” or “culture-bound” pre-
fix, what both DSM V and most of cross-cultural psychiatry 
nevertheless recognize, is that there is a class of ailments and 
syndromes that are comparatively more confined and recog-
nized amongst some cultures than others. Here are some ex-
amples of plausible candidates. Linda-Anne Rebhun, a medi-
cal anthropologist studied interrelated group of syndromes a 
northeast of Brazil, such as nervos (nerves), sustois (shock sick-
ness), and peito aberto (open chest). Rebhun explains that all of 
these ailments have to do with the experience of strong emo-
tions such as shock or anger, or as the culture terms it, “swallow-
ing frogs” (engolir sapos). For instance, peito aberto refers to the 
state of dangerous emotional openness to one’s own and others 
anger and “is said to be caused by carrying too much weight, 
which makes the heart expand, opening the chest, and allowing 
evil influences to enter” (Rebhun, 1994, p. 369). The syndrome 
also comes with a very specific means of diagnosis and treat-
ment. The diagnosis is performed by measuring a string twice 
against the patient’s forearm and then looping it around the 
chest; if the measured length does not close securely around 
the chest (and it never does), a diagnosis of the syndrome made. 
The treatment of the syndrome occurs by Folk Catholic faith 
healers using prayers, and pushing inward on the chest and 
breasts. Then the string is measured again and again looped 
over the chest; this time, if the treatment is successful, it fits. 
Relief is thought to be immediate but temporary, because the 
situations that give rise to peito aberto are recurrent. 
A more publicized example of a cultural syndrome is 
from Cambodia: Khyâl ko (wind overload). Khyâl ko is one of 
several “khyâl attacks”. These syndromes were already pres-
ent in the Cambodian culture prior to becoming a French 
colony, but have since then become integrated with and are 
often understood in terms of the collective trauma after 
the Pol Pot regime. Khyâl is understood to be a wind-like 
substance moving inside the blood vessels inducing attacks 
and disturbances in different parts of the body (Hinton et 
al., 2001). According to psychiatrist Devon Hinton and 
colleagues, khyâl ko is associated with dizziness, shortness of 
breath, and neck soreness, and is amongst other things felt 
upon rising from standing and “results in orthostatic panic, 
that is, panic upon rising from lying or sitting to standing” 
(2009, p. 299). The sensations related to standing are also 
associated with triggering flashbacks of syncopal (brief loss 
of consciousness) episodes during the Pol Pot regime that 
brought many Cambodians in forced labour camps to the 
brink of starvation. 
Social learning of cultural 
syndromes
As the above examples brings to a fore, cultural syn-
dromes typically occur in relation to the experience of over-
whelming negative emotions, including fear, anger, anxiety, 
shock and panic (Sumathipala et al., 2004; Hinton et al., 
2009). At the same time, these syndromes are intimately con-
nected to specific beliefs systems and practices of a particular 
culture. It is at this juncture of cultural dependence and phys-
ical/emotional dependence that the cultural evolutionary 
framework provides some insights into how these syndromes 
come about and are retained within specific cultures.
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Consider the cultural syndrome hwa byung (fire sickness), 
which involves symptoms of abdominal pain sensations relat-
ed to the experience of anger that is found not only in Korea 
but also amongst Koreans in the United States (Lin, 1983). On 
a first approximation, we might think that such a syndrome 
represents a means of coping and making physical sense of nega-
tive emotions (like anger) that overwhelm the individual. However, 
without an historical or evolutionary perspective, such a cur-
sory understanding does not make sense of why an individual 
would adopt such seemingly maladaptive behaviour – surely 
there are many other ways of coping? In fact, one would ex-
pect there to be some individually tailored or situation-specif-
ic means which would be better suited to understanding and 
coping with the negative emotions. In other words, we require 
some tools from cultural evolutionary theory to explain the 
reliable retention of CS given the prima facie possibility of be-
ing “washed out”, for instance by completely novel or individual 
means of coping with negative emotions? 
The problem described here is a version of the general 
problem for the dual (gene and culture) inheritance frame-
work adopted by cultural evolutionists. Sterelny (2006) for 
example describes it as a paradox inherent in how social 
learning could be a reliable mechanism for inheritance. Based 
on the sophisticated cognitive capacities that are precisely re-
quired for culture, we would expect it to be more likely that 
the individual’s behaviour will become more flexible depend-
ing on her past experiences and her ability to adapt to con-
text-relative features. Arguably, the experiences of negative 
emotions, with their variable strength and valence, are pre-
cisely where we would imagine the means of coping would 
be flexible.  
Now to resolve this paradox, dual inheritance advocates 
are likely to draw on cognitive biases like conformist biases, the 
tendency to copy the most common variant of local practice, 
and content biases, the tendency to copy variants that are easy 
to remember and transmit, to explain the reliable retention 
and inheritance (see, Richerson and Boyd, 2008). But it is 
unclear how much help this would be in the case of cultural 
syndromes. Cultural syndromes do not necessarily represent 
the most prevalent way of coping with negative emotions 
even within a culture. As such, they seem less “frequency de-
pendent” than other proposed culturally transmitted traits 
that typically interest cultural evolutionary theorists. And 
although the relationship between CS and their accompany-
ing rich narratives may render them particularly memorable 
models for coping, it is unclear how this feature could explain 
how syndromes are relatively confined to some cultures. One 
would expect that memorability alone would either outcom-
pete other variants and lead to a spread between cultures. 
Sterelny’s own solution focuses on cultural variants such 
as tool use, cooperative norms, and agriculture. He suggests 
that prior generations do not simply contribute by providing 
models that can be the targets of social learning; they are also 
responsible for modifying and scaffolding the selective envi-
ronment for the traits (2006). The appeal is thus to cultural 
niche construction and scaffolded learning in explaining the re-
liable retention of cultural traits.2 In the case of CS, we can 
imagine that the selective environment would involve the cul-
tural-specific narratives that scaffold both the understanding 
of ones’ predicament and also the learning of particular mod-
els for coping with overwhelming stressors and emotions. The 
fact that many of these syndromes are typically only partially 
manifest in behavior of the models does lend support for the 
idea that scaffolded learning by means of narratives and so 
on would be required to bolster the successful transmission 
of the complete model and beliefs attached to cultural syn-
dromes (see Godman, 2015).3 This also seems to be one of 
the themes of Ian Hacking’s account of transient mental ill-
ness that emphasizes the role of individuals interacting with 
certain labels and beliefs about themselves in a cultural niche 
as contributing to the spread and changing nature of disorders 
(Hacking, 1998).
While I am generally sympathetic to evoking cultur-
al niche construction and scaffolded learning for addressing 
the retention and accumulation of cultural variants, I think 
Sterelny’s account would be strengthened if it also drew on 
motivational biases as well as biases in the selective environ-
ment. In particular, I would like to argue that social motivations 
might be key for ensuring the retention and cultural varia-
tion of traits such cultural syndromes. This is not the place 
to give a complete argument for the unique and potentially 
privileged role for social motivations in explaining the evo-
lution of cultural variants in general (see Nielsen and Blank, 
2011; Heyes, 2012; Godman et al., 2014); instead I will mere-
ly sketch some of the empirical support for the role of social 
motivations in social learning and indicate why I think they 
seem particularly fit to explain the cultural specific retention 
of cultural syndromes.
Following Cecilia Heyes, I take social motivations to be 
understood in this context as input mechanisms for our (so-
cial) learning process, where they have the role of privileging 
information from social channels, e.g. information provided 
by people in our environment. In other words, it need not only 
be information provided by imitation or mimicry, but obser-
vation of social stimuli in general (Heyes, 2012). One means 
by which social motivations are able to privilege or bias such 
information is by making the process of learning from others, 
through social observation and interaction, more enjoyable 
2 Paired with cultural group selection, the account would thus allow us to hold that CS might be individually maladaptive yet beneficial 
for the group as a whole (for instance by being a means of enforcing norms and cohesion within the community).
3 Linquist (2007) also explores Sterelny’s proposed problems in the context of a dual-inheritance model for emotions, such as guilt, ar-
guing that acquisition in early childhood along with strict vertical parent-offspring transmission can account for the reliable inheritance 
of emotions. I do not dispute Linquist’s solution for at least some emotions, but think they are not as applicable in the case of CS for the 
simple reason that they do not typically arise early in development.
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and rewarding than what individual action and learning is or 
would be (Godman, 2013). 
This proposal finds support in developmental and 
comparative psychology where social motivation is a strong 
contender for explaining various features attached to the 
pan-cultural human propensity for so-called overimitation, i.e. 
the tendency to reproduce a high fidelity match of the mod-
el’s behavior to the extent that the task efficiency is reduced 
(Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010). When we overimitate we do 
not reach the goal in the most effective way possible, but try to 
do it in precisely the way it has been modeled to us. Children 
begin to overimitate at the age of two and are also more prone 
to copy demonstrators with whom they have a prior social 
bonds than strangers (Nielsen and Blank, 2011). As children 
mature between the age of three and five, they have an in-
creased tendency to over imitate and adults do it just as much 
as five-year olds do (McGuigan et al., 2011).
These results from overimitation studies cannot be at-
tributed to failures of competence as a famous study shows 
that chimpanzees can copy full behavioral sequences involved 
in similar task designs, but tend to eliminate redundant com-
ponents of the sequence when the causal relation between 
actions and outcomes become apparent (Horner and Whit-
en, 2005). Instead, social motivations provide a compelling 
explanation of the prevalence of overimitation amongst hu-
mans. The thought is simply that reproducing the complete 
modeled actions of another human being is more important 
than merely producing the outcomes more efficiently. We are 
not only motivated to perform the task itself but also moti-
vated to engage with others because of the social rewards con-
ferred by such activities. That is, imitation, overimitation, and 
social learning more generally, does not merely function as a 
means of learning skills or acquiring information about the 
world; they also function as mean of enjoying and engaging 
with others, which in turn facilitates the formation of social 
bonds (Uzgiris, 1981; Nielsen and Blank, 2011; McGuigan 
et al., 2011). Social learning in contrast to individual learn-
ing thus not only represents an opportunity for adopting be-
havior from parents and other peers, but also for partaking in 
the social rewards attached to interacting with these peers. 
Moreover the proposal makes sense from an ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic perspective; involving social motivations in hu-
man learning allows us to bond and affiliate with our peers 
and community – something which is crucial to wellbeing 
and, indeed, survival (Chevallier et al., 2012; Godman, 2013).
A reasonable prediction based on the social motivation 
hypothesis for the overimitation studies is then that whenever 
the opportunity for social rewards and bonds are particularly 
salient part of the target for learning, how the effect is produced 
will matter more than that it is produced in the most effec-
tive way possible – indeed, it seems, sometimes it will matter 
more than that the effect is produced at all. I contend that this 
is precisely what is going on in the case of CS as a means of 
coping with and getting recognition for our psychological and 
emotional challenges. The clusters of symptoms and attribu-
tions associated with particular CS are reliably reoccur within 
a culture because the means of coping with negative emotions 
are often more important than the ends, i.e. that one copes with 
the emotion in question. A weaker, and perhaps more plausi-
ble proposal along similar lines is that overwhelming negative 
emotions can be just as successfully – or unsuccessfully – dealt 
with by various means, but individual’s who copy existing mod-
els in their culture at least reap additional social benefits associ-
ated to reproducing those variants favored by that culture.
The salient thing with cultural syndromes (and indeed 
the reason that that they are lumped together) is that they 
then tend to be precisely confined within specific cultures. We 
can now explain this because of their exclusive role within the 
very culture to which the individual belongs. Overwhelmed 
by negative emotions individuals can use the culturally avail-
able resources represented by existing models of syndromes, 
and in the process affiliate themselves with others of the same 
culture and get access to medical and community support. 
This then not only explains the CS retention within cultures, 
but also variability between cultures. For example, other mod-
els of managing overwhelming anger than hwa byung (fire 
sickness) are not going to be an option for most Koreans even 
if they are more effective since they are not going to facilitate 
recognition and affiliation amongst peers. Consistent with the 
social motivation hypothesis, some syndromes might also de-
velop due to the motivation to adopt models that helps that 
individual avoid implicit or explicit social disapproval or stig-
ma. While the same individuals are in some sense free to use 
any even more efficient means available for coping or dealing 
with negative emotions or disorders, not just use the cultur-
ally sanctioned means, they will then risk loosing out on the 
social rewards of conforming – or incur social stigmatization. 
Are cultural syndromes social 
constructions?
So far, I have explored how we might explain the reten-
tion and cultural variability of cultural syndromes by drawing 
on tools from cultural evolution theory where the models of 
coping with overwhelming negative emotions represent cul-
turally selected and reproduced variants. In particular, I have 
argued that social motivations along with niche construction 
are an important element in the cultural transmission of CS, 
since they jointly explain why the particularities for how to 
cope with negative emotions are retained even in contexts 
were there are more successful competing models. 
But what implications does this have for treating CS as 
actual syndromes or even mental disorders, which themselves 
require treatment and medication for alleviation? After all, 
not every syndrome finds its relief by friendly conversations, 
prayers and local healers; some might require interventions 
by more cross-culturally recognized medically and psychi-
atrically educated professionals and perhaps assistance from 
pharmaceuticals. So while CSs might represent the principal 
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culturally sanctioned means of coping with certain negative 
emotions and traumas that is not to say that they are easily 
dispelled. In fact, they are often co-morbid with other anxi-
ety and distress disorders (Guarnaccia and Rogler, 1999). In 
this section, I want to argue that worries about not taking CS 
seriously as disorder would only apply if one is committed to 
anti-realist interpretation of the variants of cultural evolution 
theory. Fortunately, the account at hand is not committed to 
this interpretation.4
According to an anti-realist interpretation of CS, the 
syndromes are truly narrative- or belief-dependent, or to 
use jargon, “social constructions”, such that if the individual 
did not have the narratives or beliefs they would not devel-
op the syndrome. This interpretation would be natural if we 
understood CS as primarily explained by the particular, and 
often false, (inherited) belief system of the culture. The so-
cial learning argument of the last section might on such an 
interpretation be understood as indicating that the way CS 
is transmitted is primarily by belief adoption: one only devel-
ops the syndromes as a result of believing that the emotions 
and further symptoms one experiences conform or are in line 
with the cultural models. 
The problem with such an account is not so much what 
it says – but what it leaves out. Certainly, the specific cultural 
beliefs play some role in the development of the cultural syn-
dromes, as they do in diseases and disorders more generally. 
Perhaps the clearest case is of functional somatic disorders 
like irritable bowel syndrome and fibromyalgia, where the 
condition partially depends on the individual’s interpretation 
of their emotions or physiology in order for the syndrome to 
develop (Wesseley et al., 1999).5 The beliefs here play a causal 
role which often make matters worse for the individuals, or, at 
least in the short-term, through generating certain feedback 
loops (Hacking, 1998). And the same belief-dependency is 
arguably relevant in many physical illnesses. So the mere be-
lief dependency requirement these syndromes does not seem 
to be sufficient to mark out cultural syndromes as social con-
structions.
Certainly culture specific beliefs are typically involved in 
CS, such as in the case of khyâl ko where any expected dizzi-
ness is interpreted as being due to a wind-like substance in 
the blood vessels. All the same, the emphasis on the interac-
tion with the cultural beliefs anti-realist social constructivists 
tends to leave an important element of the story, namely that 
the overwhelming negative emotions like distress, anger and 
anxiety makes a real and, I contend, typically more important 
causal contribution to the development of the syndrome than 
the beliefs. In the case of khyâl ko this is evident in the fear 
that overwhelms the cognition and make some Cambodians 
hyper-vigilant to any sensation they may feel on standing 
(Hinton et al., 2009). Not only do the emotions underwrite 
the counterfactual just as beliefs do (if the person had not 
been overwhelmed by these emotions, they would not have 
developed the syndromes), they also provide the conditions for 
self-ascription and potential feedback-loops, which make her 
beliefs causally relevant. That is, if the individual had not been 
overwhelmed by the negative emotions she would be unlikely 
to ascribe the particular narratives and find affinity with the 
cultural models for coping.6 In addition, from the perspec-
tive of cultural evolution, a person must experience strong 
or overwhelming negative emotions that cause suffering or 
reduced fitness before an identification with the models of 
dealing with these emotions and exposing oneself to the costs 
associated with the syndrome will be worthwhile. 
Another way in which social constructivism of CS fo-
cuses too narrowly on belief-dependence is that, as we saw 
in the last section, a rather complex set of “biases”, which are 
cognitive, ecological as well as motivational, must be in place 
for CS to be socially learned and retained within a particular 
culture. It thus seems sensible not to view social learning pri-
marily as a means of belief transmission but rather as a more 
general capacity for learning cultural behavior related to the 
need for social affiliation. This has implications for what kind 
of science and possible interventions we should expect to be 
productive in the case of CS. Ethnographic and anthropolog-
ical studies may still be fruitful in discerning the beliefs in-
volved in cultural narratives and attributions of syndromes. 
The particular cultural evolution account I favour however 
implies that we should be sceptical toward the particular 
content of the beliefs being part of the explanation for why 
particular models or variants of coping were selected and 
survive over others (cf. Sperber, 2000). After all the social 
learning mechanisms operate largely independently of the 
content of the particular cultural beliefs about the syndrome. 
In particular, I have argued because of our biasing social mo-
tivations, “who” we are learning and seeking sanction from 
often matters more than “what” we are believing in order to 
cope. Moreover, both the relevant triggering emotions and 
the social learning mechanism, which explain the retention 
and cultural variability of CS, are by in large pan-cultural. As 
such cultural syndromes should also still be studied as part of 
cross-cultural psychology and psychiatry. 
4 It may be that there are some things that are considered CS where such social constructivist anti-realism is justified. Here I am con-
cerned to show that a cultural evolutionist of CS need not accept anti-realist conclusions.
5 This is not to deny that irritable bowel syndrome and fibromyalgia could also be Western cultural syndromes – indeed they might well 
be.
6 Of course the emotions might themselves be in response to specific cultural pressures. For example, the syndromes in northeast Brazil 
seem linked to the gender-specific cultural roles and expectations, such that women are expected to contain their indignation and anger 
to a larger extent than men. The group of related syndromes are arguably also tailored as a means to sustain this gender role. But it 
would be a mistake to take all strong emotions as ultimately caused by social and cultural pressures, as some but might be in response 
to “non-cultural” features, like poverty or starvation.
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Finally, I believe that the account I have proposed is at 
least consistent with the current recommendation for treat-
ment and interventions of CS. People do not stop developing 
syndromes merely because other more effective model of cop-
ing suddenly become available and certainly not due to simply 
being told that the relevant beliefs attached to the syndromes 
are improbable or false. Cultural evolution may be much more 
rapid than biological evolution but past successful variants are 
rarely washed out within a generation or two. Instead, the rec-
ommendations for treatment of CS are typically in line with 
how to treat many other psychiatric disorders, like post-trau-
matic stress disorder and panic disorders such as taking both 
the initial anxieties and the illness attributions and represen-
tations as seriously as possible (Hinton et al., 2009). In other 
words, by at least initially giving precisely social recognition to 
the syndrome and the sources of distress and despair.
Conclusion
I began this essay by arguing that we can understand cul-
tural syndromes on the cultural evolution account as cultur-
ally endorsed variants for coping with overwhelming negative 
emotions. Given that I argued for the prominent role of cul-
tural narratives and social endorsement in the CS, I worried 
that one might take this to support an anti-realism about CS. 
While some constructivist insights about belief dependency 
and the possibility of feedback loops are correct, I neverthe-
less argued that the framework is impoverished as a general 
model for explaining cultural syndromes. 
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